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I.

INTRODUCTION
This Reply Brief is intended to respond to the arguments raised by the State's brief

and will not repeat each argument made in Mr. Knott's Opening Brief. No waiver of such
arguments is intended by the failure to repeat such arguments here.
The parties do not dispute the standard of review to be applied by this Court to the
issues raised in the briefs. See, Appellant's Opening Brief, hereinafter "AOB, pp. 3-4 and
Respondent's Brief, hereinafter "RB,' pp. 4-5.
II.

THE REFUSAL WAS NOT RELEVANT, ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
BECAUSE THE OFFICER PROVIDED INCORRECT ADVICE
CONCERNING THE REFUSAL
The State baldly concludes that "[b]y refusing a test that would either support or

preclude his prosecution for DUI, Knott demonstrated consciousness of guilt, rendering
his refusal relevant." (RB, p. 5.) This statement begs the issue before this Court
whether the officer's incorrect and misleading advice undermines the reliability of the
subsequent refusal such that evidence of the refusal should be excluded in the State's
case-in-chief.
Respondent relies on State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 206, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958), but in
that case the officer did not provide any improper advice. Moreover, Appellant conceded
that in certain instances a refusal may be admitted at trial and is not seeking an absolute
bar on the admission of the refusal in all driving under the influence cases. (AOB, p. 4.)
The critical question before this Court is, where the officer provided incorrect
1

advice, whether the State provided a sufficient foundation to support the relevance of a
refusal which is admitted solely to prove a defendant's consciousness of guilt. In this
instance, the Magistrate erred in concluding that the officer's misleading warnings about
the consequences of refusing did not undermine the relevance of the refusal at trial.
Without a proper foundation, the refusal loses its relevance as consciousness of
guilt. This analysis has been applied by the appellate courts in the State of Alaska.
In Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), the court said:
Although an arrestee may be without the advice of counsel, he
is entitled to a warning by the police. The police are not
required to inform the arrestee that he has the right to refuse;
however, if he does refitse, he must be advised of the
consequences flowing from his refusal and be permitted to
reconsider his refusal in light of that information.

Id. at 1212 n.15 ( emphasis added; citation omitted). In Copelin the court
was considering the refusal to take a breathalyzer examination in the
context of a prosecution for driving while intoxicated or driving with a
. I 0% blood-alcohol level. In such cases the prosecution offers the refusal as
circumstantial evidence to show consciousness of guilt. Thus the supreme
court was establishing a foundation for admitting refusal evidence. The
court had previously indicated a distrust of consciousness of guilt evidence
based on silence in the face of accusations and refusals to provide evidence.
See Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Alaska 1983). The court, however,
did not address refusal to supply physical characteristic evidence. See id. at
1199. By requiring that the arrestee be infonned of the consequences of his
refusal the court meant to ensure that the refusal would in fact support an
inference of guilt.
Svedlund v. Municipality ofAnchorage, 671 P.2d 378 (Alask. App. 1983).
In the instant case, the local police in Blaine County should have been aware of the
problem with the advisory for out-of-state drivers. As the court noted in State v. Kling,
2

Idaho 188, 189,245 P.3d 449 (Ct. App. 2010), the local magistrate had ruled
"[ c]onsistent with his prior rulings on the same issues dating back a number of years ... ;
there can thus be no excuse for the officer to provide incorrect information about the
consequences of a refusal, and the State in its case-in-chief should not benefit from that
erroneous information. 1
Furthermore, as discussed in the opening briet: the Magistrate erred in his analysis
of the matter under I.R.E. 403, because he made a legal ruling applicable to all cases that
the dismissal of a refusal in the civil context did not impact a criminal trial. See, RB, pp.
70. As a result, the Magistrate failed to consider any other basis to exclude the
evidence as more prejudicial than probative. (See, AOB, pp. 10-12.) Respondent fails to
address these factors and reversal or remand for consideration of these factors is required.
THE MAGISTRATE'S RELIANCE ON CASES INVOL YING ADMISSION OF
ALCOHOL TEST RES UL TS IS ERRONEOUS
The State, as did the Magistrate below, argues that because the results of an
alcohol test are always admissible, even in the face of incorrect warnings, a refusal must
also be admitted without concern for the proper warnings. See, RB, p. 9-11. In support
of this position, the State and the Magistrate rejected the out-of-state authority discussed

This particular incorrect advice is unlikely to reoccur as the Idaho Transportation
Department has revised its advisory forms to correct the precise error at issue in this case.
Granting relief in this case will not open a floodgate of challenges to the admission of
refusal evidence in driving under the influence cases. But Mr. Knott should not be
prejudiced by the improper admission of the evidence in his case.
1
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Appellant's Opening Brief because those states permitted a driver to withdraw consent.
The State and the Magistrate relied on this distinction to conclude that refusal evidence is
ahvays admissible at trial regardless of the circumstances leading to a driver's refusal.
However, in Missouri v. McNeely,_ U.S._, 2013 Lexis 3160, the United States
Supreme Court held that, as a constitutional matter, implied consent does not itself
permit all alcohol testing. In addition to the reasons set forth in Appellant's Opening
Brief~ this Court must consider the import of McNeely.
In McNeely, the Supreme Court abrogated the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in

State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989) that the police may take a blood
test without a warrant, based solely on a driver's implied consent. lvfcNeely recognizes
that a person who is arrested and requested to take an alcohol test may withdraw his
previous "implied consent," a position the Idaho Courts have rejected. Since under

l'JcNeely implied consent is not unlimited, the import of the refusal advisory provided to a
person arrested for driving under the influence becomes all the more important in
determining whether a court should admit the evidence of a defendant's refusal in the
face of an officer's erroneous warning of the consequences of a refusal.
If a person has the right to refuse by withdrawing "implied consent," subject to
specific consequences of that refusal, the Magistrate's attempt to distinguish cases from
other states which explicitly grant a right of refusal must be rejected. (See, AOB, pp. 810.) This Court should accept the legal reasoning from those other jurisdictions and

4

reverse the Magistrate's decision in this case.
Appellant is not seeking a rule of absolute exclusion of a driver's refusal in all
cases; he is only seeking to apply proper foundation rules for the admission of such
evidence. When an officer does not provide correct information about the consequences
a refusal, the refusal should be excluded from the State's case-in-chief, because the
refusal lacks relevance or is more prejudicial than probative. In this case, the mis-advice
created a greater likelihood that, Mr. Knott, an out of state driver, would refuse the test
without understanding that the refusal would be used against him at trial. Mr. Knott
specifically and repeatedly asked the officer about these consequences but was provided
incorrect advice. As a result, the evidence of his refusal should have been excluded from
the State's case-in-chief.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those contained in Appellant's Opening Brief, this

Court should reverse the decision of the Magistrate or in the alternative remand for proper
consideration all the factors contained in I.R.E. 403.
Dated

of April, 2013

Attorney for Appellant
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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I, Emily Dion, declare:
I am employed in the County of Blaine, State ofldaho. I am over the age of
eighteen years and not a party to this action. My business address is 671 First Avenue
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On April 23, 2013, I served the within:
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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Daphne Huang
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Emily Dion
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